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Buddhism as Mind-Body Dualism 
Richard Hayes (1993, p. 2013) and Dan Arnold (2008, p. 2012) have made the claim that 
Dharmakīrti is a mind-body dualist by virtue of his doctrine of rebirth. Dharmakīrti offers 
“the Buddhist tradition’s most complete defences of rebirth, advanced some of this tradition’s 
most explicitly formulated arguments for mind-body dualism” (Arnold 2008, p. 1079). 
Arnold identifies Dharmakīrti as an exemplar Buddhist philosopher who defends Buddhist 
reductionism and mind-body dualism. On Dharmakīrti’s view, argues Arnold, the dynamic 
and relational character of subjectivity is not in conflict with the view that amongst the 
psychophysical components of phenomenological persons, are constitutively mental 
aggregates – feeling, perception, dispositions, awareness – whose activities such as anxiety, 
fears, desires, imaginations, memories, will, intention, although arising from physical 
aggregates, are nonetheless not reducible to physical events. But because “mental events 
cannot supervene upon physical event – [Dharmakīrti] is unmistakably dualist” (2008, p. 
1088). He adds further “it is clear, rather, that Dharmakīrti’s arguments for rebirth press a 
case for a strongly ontological sort of dualism” (Arnold 2012, p. 42). Hayes takes Arnold’s 
ontologically thin dualism one step further, defending an ontologically thicker form of mind-
body dualism according to which mind is separate from the body and can thus be related 
presently with one physical body and in the future with another. This supposition, Hayes 
argue, must be made if Dharmakīrti’s doctrine of rebirth is to make sense because without 
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having a commitment to a version of mind-body dualism, “the majority of Buddhist doctrines 
that presuppose rebirth would be mostly incoherent” (Hayes 2013, p. 395). The reason for 
this is that if there is no rebirth requiring the separation of mind and body, “then the very goal 
of attaining nirvāṇa, understood as the cessation of rebirth, becomes almost perfectly 
meaningless” (Hayes 1993, p. 128). In other words, Hayes’ claim is that without some form 
of commitment to rebirth embedded in a version of mind-body dualism, nirvāṇa which is the 
goal that Buddhists seek to achieve becomes automatically available to all who die, 
irrespective of how they may have lived. But for the theory of rebirth to make sense, Hayes 
claims; Dharmakīrti must hold that mind and body are two separate substances, only then 
would it be able to justify the supposition that the same mind can associate now with one 
body and in the next life with another; and in fact that the mind must be propelled between 
bodies until enlightenment is achieved ending the cycle of rebirths (Hayes 2013: p. 395). 
Hayes’ paper does not explicitly attribute to Dharmakīrti any one form of mind-body 
dualism in particular. However, if my interpretation of Hayes’ position is correct, the form of 
mind-body dualism he is attributing to Dharmakīrti appears strikingly similar to the 
ontologically thick sort of dualism (in contrast with Arnold’s ontologically thin sort of 
dualism), that we find in Brahmanical schools, the metaphysical view that persons have two 
fundamentally and irreducibly different properties of which the mind is the persistent and the 
body the non-persistent. 
Hayes claims Dharmakīrti is committed to mind-body dualism by virtue of his belief 
in rebirth: that he holds the mind and body are separate entities, of which the mind or 
consciousness is the same surviving or persistent entity and the body in which its resides 
continually undergo changes, thus, is different in different lives. Notice, though, Hayes 
himself does not use the terms “same” or “persistent” to describe the mind, but he comes very 
close when he does use the term “changing” to describe the body against which he contrasts 
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the mind. And he also does explicitly assert that the mind “survives” the death of the physical 
body whereas the body naturally does not persist or “does not survive” its death. Based on the 
supposition that it is the same persistent mind, he goes on to claim: “it must be supposed that 
the mentality is separate from the physical body and can therefore be associated now with 
one physical body and now with another” (Hayes 2013, p. 395 Italics added). Here Hayes is 
implicitly claiming that for Dharmakīrti’s rebirth theory to make sense, he must posit mind as 
the same persistent entity separate from the body which undergoes change, and therefore, 
must be different in each life. Only when Dharmakīrti holds the mind to have the same 
persistent nature, on Hayes account, could it be said to have a relationship with one type of 
body now in this life and with another in the future life.   
Assuming that Hayes’ reading of Dharmakīrti is correct, we can reconstruct the mind-
body dualism argument which Hayes attributes to Dharmakīrti as follows: 
1. My body does not survive after death. 
2. My mind survives the death of an old material body and takes on a new future 
material body. 
3. Therefore, rebirth occurs since my mind can be associated presently with one body 
and in the future with another. (1, 2 modus pollens) 
4. It follows; therefore, mind and body are distinct. (1, 2, 3 modus pollens) 
 
Let us suppose that Hayes is right that Dharmakīrti asserts a theory of rebirth which 
requires a separation of the mind and the body and that Dharmakīrti seeks its cessation 
(nirvāṇa), that is, the cessation of the belief that the mind is separate from the body (as its 
soteriological goal). There are three immediate absurd consequences Dharmakīrti faces.  
First, according to the Mahāyāna Buddhist arhats, ārya-bodhisattvas, and buddhas 
have already attained nirvāṇa (they are all “enlightened beings”) and have done so because 
they are supposed to have been liberated from the conditions that bind themselves to the 
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repeated cycle of saṁsāric births and deaths. A condition which brings about rebirth, on 
Dharmakīrti’s account, would be no other than the separation of mind and body; his claim is 
that because mind is separate from the body, rebirth occurs. It follows from his claim; that 
nirvāṇa is a freedom from the unity of mind and body, and thus that any living enlightened 
being who has attained nirvāṇa, on his account, cannot be an embodied being – she must be 
either wholly body (with no mind), or wholly mind (with no body), or neither of the two 
(having neither the mind nor the body). The enlightened Buddha, on Dharmakīrti’s analysis, 
ought to be regarded as either purely a physical being (absent mental states) or purely a 
mental being (absent any physical body), or a being with neither any physical body nor any 
mental states.  
Second, it is not clear how Mahāyāna Buddhist’s could explain the claim that 
awakened beings repeatedly return to the world for the welfare of other beings. There seem to 
be only three equally problematic options available for Mahāyāna Buddhism if Dharmakīrti’s 
claim is correct. It should either assume that those awakened beings – bodhisattvas and 
buddhas – are just bodies without minds, or just minds without bodies, or neither (absent of 
both bodies and minds). The fourth possible option is the standard Mahāyāna view according 
to which awakened beings who already attained nirvāṇa have done so because they perfected 
both the physical qualities of rūpakāya and the mental qualities of dharmakāya. Yet this 
fourth option will not be available for the Mahāyānist to advance; because, on Dharmakīrti’s 
mind-body dualist account, liberation precisely entails freedom from that of mind-body 
duality. Hence the standard position will not be available for Mahāyāna Buddhism to justify 
the reasons awakened beings are able to return to the world equipped with both mental and 
physical properties.   
Third, it would absurdly follow from Dharmakīrti’s thesis that nirvāṇa is available to 
anyone who rejects mind-body dualism; after all it is in virtue of holding this view that 
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beings are prevented from becoming liberated. Consequently, on Dharmakīrti’s account of 
rebirth, liberation would be available to anyone who decidedly adopts monism (e.g., 
materialism of the classical Indian Cārvāka type or physicalism of the modern philosophers).  
There are various alternative theories of mind-body dualism including substance 
dualism, property or event dualism, or vitalism. So what type of dualism does Dharmakīrti 
espouse? In other words, which version of dualism in particular could hold more promising 
parallels in capturing Dharmakīrti’s position? If, however current Buddhist philosophical 
scholarship is correct about Buddhism's overall anti-substantialism, it is unlikely that Hayes 
and Arnold would be charging Dharmakīrti with advocating ‘substance’ dualism to justify its 
rebirth theory. It would be counterintuitive to claim that Dharmakīrti might be invoking the 
sort of Cartesian mind-body dualist proof to explain his theory of rebirth. It is already widely 
recognized within Buddhist studies, by philosophers including Jay Garfield (2015), The 
Cowherds (2011, 2016), Dan Arnold (2012), Mark Siderits (2016), to name only a few who 
have persuasively demonstrated that much of classical Buddhist philosophy of mind rejects 
foundationalism in general and the Brahmanical ātmavādin doctrines of rebirth in particular. 
The Buddhist doctrine of nonself (anātman) explicitly rejects substance metaphysics and 
substance-based ontology, refuting the essentialism that drives many claims about body-mind 
dualism. Garfield, for example, has argued that dualism is a confusion which results in 
qualms about “correspondence or other reference or meaning-inducing relations, the relation 
of the self to the world, of mind to body, and the whole raft of confusions” and this confusion 
he argues is a consequence of “forgetting that the self or subject, to the extent that it is real at 
all, must be part of the world, not something standing over against it” (Garfield 2015, p. 275). 
Mark Siderits, also makes the point that a Buddhist, for whom all five aggregates - 
components of human existence – are equally dynamic, subjected to quick changes, cannot be 
accused of adopting a form of dualism which claims to endure mental substance after the 
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body ceases to exist (Siderits 2001, p. 308). Likewise, Arnold himself argues, since 
Buddhism emphasizes the relational and dynamic character of subjectivity, it appears to be 
immune to the accusation of asserting substance dualism (Arnold 2008, p. 1080).  
The type of dualism Arnold attributes to Dharmakīrti appears to closely resemble 
property dualism. But, on a closer analysis, it is not. Property dualism, unlike Dharmakīrt’s 
view of the irreducibly mental character of certain events, is a non-reductive physicalist claim 
in so far as it argues for an evolutionary emergence of mind and mental states from a 
complex organisation of purely material substance. Again, unlike Dharmakīrti’s view 
according to which mental events ontologically diverge from physical events, property 
dualist’s claim that when physical events reached a certain level of complexity nonphysical 
properties emerged from the material events and non-reductively supervene upon those 
material events. After all, property dualism holds the view “that while there is one kind of 
(physical) substance, the mind not only has physical or behavioural-material-functional 
properties, but also nonphysical behaviourally-materially-functionally ineliminable and 
irreducible properties” (Jacquette 2009, p. 22).  
Given the difficulties with both substance and property dualism we have good reason 
to believe that Arnold characterises Dharmakiriti’s form of dualism as akin to even dualism 
indeed he suggests that the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti could consistently hold the 
view that “‘persons’ consist of simply in causally continuous series of events, and that the 
series of mental events, in so far as it continues after the death of the body, has indefinite 
temporal extension” (Arnold 2008, p. 1080). 
On this line of reasoning even rebirth is rendered just a continuity of any series of 
mental events, allowing Buddhists like Dharmakīrti to account for karmic responsibility and 
their soteriological project.  
 
Nāgārjuna’s Arguments for Rebirth Theory: A Critique of Mind-Body Dualism  
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In the remaining part of the paper, I will consider a detailed critique of Dharmakīrti’s mind-
body dualist argument from Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka philosophical standpoint. The 
objections I present here, therefore, are predominantly drawn from Nāgārjuna’s works on 
phenomenological causation and the philosophy of mind which have, thus far, received little 
or no attention in the literature. The cautious approach that academic studies of Nāgārjuna 
have taken thus far with respect to these works may be understandable.  This is as amongst 
various topics that these works are concerned with is a detailed account on birth-death (the 
so-called rebirth theory) one of the “damned topics” in the philosophical studies of 
Buddhism.2 Still haunted by the Cartesian ghost story, we retain a tendency to lump all 
rebirth stories into one big Cartesian dualistic basket. Gilbert Ryle’s provides a 
groundbreaking exorcism of the Cartesian ghost, labelling the official doctrine as “The 
dogma of the Ghost in the Machine” (Ryle 2009, p. 5). His claim to have snuffed it out as 
“one big … category-mistake” (Ryle 2009, pp. 5-6), I suppose, did not have the extent of 
influence he expected. Indeed, the method Hayes employs in his analysis of Dharmakīrti’s 
concept of “rebirth” demonstrates the extent to which we are, even as modern academics, still 
in someway “wedded to the dogma of the ghost in the machine” as Ryle righly tells us (Ryle 
2009, p. 21). More problematically, we should avoid readily projecting the dogma of mind-
body dualism sweepingly onto Buddhist philosophers who may have never held such a 
commitment. Nāgārjuna is a good case in point. tucked away in his neglected works (see 
references for the details) is hidden some of the groundbreaking Mādhyamika insights into 
understanding and appreciating a radical Mādhyamika account of rebirth, phenomenology 
and the philosophy of mind, providing us the case for a completely different way to conceive 
of what rebirth entails. I hope to bring into discussions some aspects of Nāgārjuna’s radical 
insights in order to challenge the common assumptions we have about what rebirth 
necessarily entails (as exemplified by Dharmakīrti’s account). It turns out that rebirth, on 
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Nāgārjuna’s account, is nothing like what we imagine it to be, and lacks the commitments 
Hayes alleges Dharmakīrti must make.  
I will now turn to the premises in Dharmakīrti’s argument to consider specific 
objections. I will do this turn by turn in the interest of integrating the critical insights 
Nāgārjuna brings to bear upon his own conception of the rebirth. Through this dual method 
consisting of a critique of the rebirth theory entailing mind-body dualism and a defence of the 
rebirth theory that eschews any commitment to such dualism, I hope to reinforce insights 
behind Nāgārjuna’s nondichotomous and non-substantialist philosophy of mind.  
 
1. My body does not survive after death 
The first premise in Dharmakīrti’s argument states that body does not survive after death. The 
obvious assumption in this premise is that Buddhism is dualistically reductionist about 
persons, which is to claim that a person is reducible to two distinct entities: mind and body, 
and the death of person annihilates only the body, whereas the mind remains intact and 
persists. There are number of problems with this premise. For a start, in the Commentary on 
the Verses on Rice Seedling (Śālistambaka-vistarākhyāṭīkā ŚVṬ), Nāgārjuna argues that 
name-form (nāma-rūpa) survive or fall together like sheafs of reeves leaning against each 
other. The name-aggregates – feeling (vedāna), perception (saṁjñā), conditioning factors 
(saṁskāra) and consciousness (vijñānaṁ) – and the form aggregate (rūpa) – physiological 
processes – are mutually dependent, one cannot exist without the support of the others. To 
explain the argument differently, name-form (nāma-rūpa), according to Nāgārjuna, consists 
of the five sensory consciousnesses and the defiled mental consciousness (kleśamayaṁ 
manaḥ) operating in conjunction with the four great elements (caturmahābhūtāni) 
interdependently supporting each other in the manner of sheaves of reeds 
(naḍakalāpayogena) (ŚVṬ 27: mDo ‘grel Nge 39a). The reason behind putting together the 
nāma-rūpa as a compound term is precisely to reflect the fact that each person is a coherent 
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and inseparable unity of the physical aggregates and non-physical aggregates by virtue of 
mutually interdependent phenomenological causation.  
Death, Nāgārjuna argues, signifies the transient and unstable nature of the nāma-rūpa 
aggregates as produced phenomena. While Nāgārjuna does speak of death both as the end of 
an individual life span, he more crucially speaks of death as an event occurring at each 
moment: one set of nāma-rūpa aggregates cease as the conditions passing out of existence 
even as another set of nāma-rūpa aggregates arise. In either sense, death is only part of the 
law of impermanence and it does not represent an abrupt interruption or annihilation of life or 
the rūpa aggregate, independent of the nāma aggregate. While Hayes may be correct in 
claiming that death for Dharmakīrti occurs at the end of life, but to ignore the more 
significant philosophical point at stake is to misrepresent what lies at the heart of Buddhist 
philosophy of mind, the theory of death and dying. Nāgārjuna speaks of death as occurring at 
every moment. At each moment, as one causally dependent set of nāma-rūpa aggregates 
passes away another set of nāma-rūpa aggregates arise. In this sense, death is simply the very 
ontological modifications taking place in nāma-rūpa aggregates every moment, making 
possible the very existence of the aggregates as they actually are. Dharmakīrti’s claim that 
death is a sudden event that annihilates the body, without affecting the mind, is therefore, 
problematic.  
Thus, for Nāgārjuna, death – or the end of life – is a form of change that is not 
radically unlike the kind of change that takes place for everything at each moment. 
According to Nāgārjuna, both nāma-rūpa die together during death and another nāma-rūpa is 
born. But the two are not the same nāma-rūpa, nor are they entirely separate. They are 
related in that they are part of a continuum – and ‘conventionally’ we can designate the 
organism as the continuum bearer. By one nāma-rūpa we perform our actions and by these 
actions we are born as another nāma-rūpa. One nāma-rūpa finds its end in our death, another 
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nāma-rūpa takes birth from it. But the subsequent birth of nāma-rūpa is the conditioned 
result of the previous nāma-rūpa which is responsible for committing the actions under the 
influence of the afflictive defilements. When the nāma-rūpa aggregates are not released from 
this conditioned existence, they are re-born in saṃsāra. 
For Nāgārjuna it is important to note that death performs dual functions: death may 
bring to an end one type of nāma-rūpa (at the macro level), but it causes, simultaneously, the 
birth of another set of nāma-rūpa that invariably exists as the subtle nāma-rūpa aggregates. 
Candrakīrti cites the Daśābhūmi-sūtra which says, “Death also involves two activities: it 
destroys the compounds and it provides the cause for an unbroken continuum of ignorance” 
(dBu ma ‘a 59b). Candrakīrti argues, death’s two activities are however not substantially 
distinct. Death destroys the unity of corporeal compounds, at the same time that it sets in 
motion the birth of a renewed nāma-rūpa complex that sustains the unbroken continuum of 
phenomenological flux – what we call ‘person’ or ‘self’. In the Yuktiśāṣṭīkāvṛtti (YŚV 20) and 
the Prasannapadā (PP) Candrakīrti argues that death is a cause of another set of 
disintegrating nāma-rūpa, analogous to the exhaustion of the butter and the wick acting as a 
cause of the extinguishment of the butter-lamp. According to this view if a causally produced 
death can arise from its conditions, its continuum sustained by the disintegrating subtle nāma-
rūpa too must solely depend on its conditions - death. For Candrakīrti death, since it is an 
event, must have a cause, therefore it is not an intrinsic disintegration or the annihilation of 
the aggregates (PP VII.32: dBu ma ‘a 59b). Just as it is not possible for a well-protected 
butter-lamp to die out without fully consuming its oil and wick. It is not the case that death is 
intrinsically annihilating, argues Candrakīrti (YŚV 20: dBu ma Ya 15b).  
For a similar reason in ŚVṬ 41 Nāgārjuna makes the argument that rebirth follows the 
principle of non-annihilation (nocchedataḥ). According to this principle the nāma-rūpa 
aggregates that constitute the phenomenological structure of a person do not become manifest 
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from the previous annihilation of the aggregates on the edge of death nor without a cessation 
of the aggregates on the edge of death. That is, the causes of rebirth are not interrupted or 
annihilated by death because the psychophysical aggregates partaking of birth do not arise 
from the final aggregates of death (māraṇāntikeṣu skandheṣu) that have already ceased 
(pūrvaniruddheṣu), as this would imply birth without a cause, which is incoherent. Nor do the 
aggregates of birth arise from the aggregates of death that have not yet ceased (aniruddheṣu), 
as that would imply birth from an eternal cause which is equally incoherent from Nāgārjuna 
and Candrakīrti’s standpoint. But when the aggregates of death cease (nirudhyante), at that 
very moment, argues Nāgārjuna, the aggregates partaking of birth arise like the ascending 
(unnāma) and descending (avanāma) beams (daṇḍa) of a scale (tulā) (ŚS 41: mDo sde Ma 
190b-191a).3  
Thus, death is not an annihilation of the body. Nāgārjuna supplies us with two key 
reasons why he thinks, as it is for Candrakīrti in the Sixty Verses on Reasoning 
(Yuktiśāṣṭīkāvṛtti YŚV), that death is not an annihilation. Firstly that death, since it is a 
causally conditioned event, is an effect as it is an effect of another set of preceding nāma-
rūpa aggregates that is disintegrating. Secondly that death, since it is a causally conditioned 
event, is a cause as it causes the birth of another set of future nāma-rūpa aggregates to arise. 
In contrast the reductionists Naiyāyika4 and Sautrāntika5 assert that death is an intrinsic 
destruction, therefore annihilation of the rūpa – form-aggregate and the continuation of nāma 
– mental aggregates (Candrakīrti, YŚV.20: dBu ma Ya 15b). So, for both the Sautrāntika and 
the Naiyāyika, the death (disintegration) of the aggregates is entirely different from the birth 
(arising) of the aggregates. The death of the aggregates is an absence, while the birth of the 
aggregates is a presence (existent), with a cause (in the case of the Naiyāyika) or without a 
cause (in the case of the Sautrāntika), acting upon the death.  
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For non-reductionist Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, however, the disintegration of the 
aggregates is itself an activity of the aggregates that sustains its existence: the two are not 
different. Thus, disintegration of the aggregates is not incompatible with its existence, and 
disintegration has a cause and it produces an effect. For whatever exists is causally effective. 
Therefore, for Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti death, is similar to any other change in that it is 
causally productive; it produces an effect and it arises from causes, hence it is not an 
annihilation.  
It is problematic, thus, to claim that the Buddhist theory of death entails the 
destruction of rūpa-aggregate, but not nāma-aggregate BECAUSE buddhist death doesn’t 
entail annihilation but transformation – and this applies as much to both nama and rupa 
aggregate. 
 
2. My mind survives the death of the material body 
In Premise 2 Dharmakīrti claims that the mind survives the death of the material body. It is 
obvious Hayes’ claim is operating on the same assumption as seen in Premise 1, that is, that 
on Dharmakīrti’s view, mind and body are separate and only mind persists or “survives” the 
death whereas the body does not. To claim that the mind survives death is to assert that the 
mind persists after death, and it would entail reification from the Mādhyamika standpoint. As 
we shall see both Nāgārjuna and Kamalaśīla show that the claim that mind is persistent is 
incoherent in the context of the Buddhist account of birth and death. Rebirth in the Buddhist 
context, Nāgārjuna proposes, is a simple continuation of a nāma-rūpa complex (and I will 
return to this point at the end of the paper for a detailed consideration), not the persistence of 
mind, and that is the heart of the argument Nāgārjuna is making. Without separate and 
persistent mind and body, we don't get the mind-body dualism to which Hayes claims 
Dharmakīrti is committed. Moreover, Kamalaśīla’s arguments from his Light of the Middle 
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Way (Madhyamakāloka, MA) shows a persistent mind is causally inert, as it does not have the 
causal efficacy to produce karmic effects either:  
• successively (krama), 	
• non-successively (akrama) or 	
• simultaneously (tāvat). 	
First, according to Kamalaśīla, a persistent mind lacks the causal efficacy to produce 
any effect on the body successively, for a persistent mental cause would be, by definition, 
constantly, and uninterruptedly causally active on the body, assuming that they can interact. 
A persistent mental cause's efficacy is entirely unshackled - not contingent upon other 
conditions - and so in principle, a persistent mind should produce its body perpetually. In 
which case body, would also exist forever; therefore, rebirth would make no sense, as it 
would be effectively annulled. If, however, a persistent mind produces its rebirth 
successively, or intermittently (Dharmakīrti’s rebirth theory seems to rely on either of these 
possibilities) thus affecting the body this way, there is an inconsistency problem. Successive 
rebirths can be produced only by non-persistent causes because the timing of their succession 
is governed by necessary but equally changing causal conditions. But the continuous causal 
processes which seem to underpin rebirth are impossible if it is true that the mind which 
causally produce the future body is itself persistent (Kamalaśīla, MA: dBu ma Sa 192a).  
Dharmakīrti could reply to the above objection by claiming that a persistent or 
surviving mind does depend upon such other conditions. Even that would, on Kamalaśīla's 
argument, deliver him into other inconsistencies. Because the cause is a persistent mind, the 
conditions upon which it depends would also be persistent, and the problem would repeat 
itself. The inability to explain causal succession (which is necessary to support Dharmakīrti’s 
rebirth theory) would just be shifted one link down the causal chain. On the other hand, 
accepting a persistent mental cause's dependence on non-persistent conditions to produce 
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rebirths successively would be an admission of its non-persistence – because a mind is a 
conditioned phenomenon it cannot endure longer than the conditions that give rise to it, let 
alone after death. 
In either case, it makes no sense for a persistent mind to depend upon supporting 
conditions, which are all changing to produce rebirths. Either one has to posit that the 
conditions also are persistent and we are no closer to an explanation of successive rebirths, or 
one has to admit that mind is non-persistent. Either way, the claim that rebirth requires a 
persistent mind is undermined (Kamalaśīla MA: dBu ma Sa 192a). 
Second, likewise, it makes no sense to claim that a persistent mind could produce 
rebirth non-successively, that is, without the need of successive causal change. A non-
successive rebirth as an effect could be a theoretically valid solution to some logical 
problems posed by a persistent cause, but the problem is that such non-successive effects are 
not found anywhere empirically or phenomenologically outside the domain of theory. 
Phenomenological effects are observed to occur intermittently, in succession. In the case of 
rebirth theory founded on the mind-body dualism which posits a persistent mind as its cause, 
the arising of rebirth (as an effect) inevitably has to proceed from its persistent mind as its 
cause. But this type of causation is not available for the claim according to which rebirth 
occurs due to a persistent mind. Without the mind undergoing change or cessation, rebirth as 
an effect cannot arise, but this phenomenological fact is what, according to Kamalaśīla, 
makes rebirth possible. After all, it is what entails successive causal change which allows the 
occurrence of rebirth. 
For causation to continue beyond a single cause and effect, something must succeed 
it. Successive causal change is thus the very basis of "causation" itself. Causation simply is 
the succession of causes and effects, and succession requires cessation. But the cessation of a 
persistent mental cause, as we have repeatedly seen, is unreasonable, for persistence is by 
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definition unceasing. And if it were to cease, the mental cause would have to give up its 
claims to have a persistent nature; one must necessarily accept it as non-persistent like the 
body. Thus, Kamalaśīla concludes, a persistent mental cause is no more able to produce 
rebirth as its effect non-successively than it is successively (Kamalaśīla MA: dBu ma Sa 
192b-193a). 
Finally, persistent mental causes lack the causal efficacy for simultaneous production 
(tāvattad yujyate) of rebirth as its effect, for an effect simultaneous to its cause would never 
stop being produced. It is the nature of a persistent cause to cause things, and a cause which 
continues to exist past the moment of its effect’s production would keep causing. A 
productive persistent mental cause, then, would create an absurd feedback loop of endless 
production of rebirths. Again, we cannot deny this function without denying the mental 
cause’s persistent nature. A mental cause which would cease causing after causing its rebirth 
(as an effect) would have to renounce its claims to have a persistent nature.   
Thus, it is clear from the above arguments that a persistent mental cause is both 
logically incoherent and phenomenologically impossible. A persistent mental cause is 
precluded from producing rebirth as its effect successively, non-successively and 
simultaneously. Since a rebirth can only take these three forms, the failure of the persistent 
mental cause to demonstrate its causal competence in a single one of these forms disqualifies 
a persistent mental cause from productive power entirely (Kamalaśīla MA: dBu ma Sa 
193ab). 
Against the mind-body dualism according to which a mind survives the death of the 
material body, Nāgārjuna also deploys two arguments. The first argument is from the 
principle of non-persistence (na śāśvatato) according to which the aggregates on the edge 
(antikāḥ) of death (maraṇa) are one thing and those partaking of birth are quite another. 
Those final aggregates partaking of death are also not identical to those aggregates partaking 
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of birth. The causes which produce (upapatti) are precisely the ones which destroy 
(vināśakāḥ). The causes that destroy are also just the ones which produce. Since this is the 
case, when the final (antikāḥ) aggregates of death (maraṇa) likewise cease (nirudhyante), the 
aggregates partaking of birth arise (prādurbhavanti). Therefore, causes of rebirth including 
consciousness are not persistent (na śāśvatataḥ) (ŚVṬ 63: mDo ‘grel Nge 50a). Therefore, it 
is false that the same mind survives the death of the body.  
It is against this mind-body dualist claim that Nāgārjuna’s argument from the 
principle of non-transmigration (na saṁkrāntitaḥ) is also primarily directed. According to 
this argument, in phenomenological causal process, there is no dharma6 anywhere (kvacid) 
that goes from this world (asmāllokāt) to the next; nevertheless, from the collocation of 
causes and conditions, there is the effect of karma, appearance (abhyeti) (ŚK 56: mDo ‘grel 
Nge 20b). In the Commentary on the Heart of Dependent Origination 
(Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayavyākhyāna PSHV) an interlocutor raises this question: so, is it the 
case that there is no real sentient being that transmigrates (saṅkrāmati) from this world 
(asmāllokāt) to the next world (paralokaṁ)? Nāgārjuna’s response is emphatic. He says that 
there is “nothing” whatsoever that transmigrates (na saṅkrāmati), from this world to the next 
world, including even a “minute particle” (sūkṣmo'ṇurapi). He says, it is just that “from 
‘exclusively empty’ (śūnyebhya) phenomenon arise only ‘empty phenomenon’ (śūnyā 
dharmāḥ)” (Nāgārjuna PSHV: dBu ma Tsa 148a). The empty causes consist of afflictions 
(kleśa) – ignorance, craving and clinging – and karmic actions (volitional actions and 
becoming). These causes apparently lacked (rahitebhyo) both “I” and “Mine” – the selfhood 
(ātma) and the ownership by such selfhood (ātmīya) - and yet from the nexus of these empty 
causes arise dependently designated “empty effects” (phalakalpitāḥ śūnyāḥ) of the so-called 
"birth" that lacked a selfhood (Nāgārjuna PSHV: dBu ma Tsa 148a). 
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 It is noteworthy that Nāgārjuna just says “birth,” not “re-birth.” This is a significant 
point because for the latter to be possible there has to be a selfhood or consciousness that 
transmigrate from the former to the future life without undergoing a substantial change. 
When there is no transmigration of any entity, there is just birth, but technically, no rebirth. 
The lack of the selfhood is true even in the case of a birth (as an effect) which is produced 
from the mutual dependence of the causes and conditions that lacked the selfhood and those 
that lacked the ownership by such self. Therefore, transmigration is not possible: hence 
rebirth is not possible. It it not possible for the entities that intrinsically lacked selfhood 
(svabhāvato'nātma) and those which arise (prabhavanti) from those entities that intrinsically 
lacked selfhood to be born again, or to repeat their existence (Nāgārjuna PSHV: dBu ma Tsa 
148a). 
However, there is birth because there are empty karmic causes from which arise the 
empty effects. That is, there is nothing whatsoever within the phenomenological structure of 
a person including a consciousness that transmigrates from this world to another world. 
Therefore, there is nothing that is reborn. In birth, there is only the appearance of the fruit of 
karma in virtue of the non-deficiency of causes and conditions. Nāgārjuna furnishes his 
argument with a range of allegories with these he illustrates the way in which the entities that 
intrinsically lacked selfhood arise from those entities that are themselves intrinsically empty 
of such selfhood. 
svādhyāyadīpamudrādarpaṇaghoṣa'rkakāntabījāmlaiḥ| 
skandhapratisandhirasaṅkramaśca vidvadbhiravadhāryau || 
Like a recitation, a lamp, a mirror, a seal, a magnifying glass, a seed, sourness, or a 
sound, so also with the conception of the aggregates— the wise knows they are not 
transmigrated (Nāgārjuna Heart of Dependent Origination (Pratitīyasamutpādahṛdaya PSH, 
dBu ma Tsa 146b). 
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We shall consider here, given space constraints, only the first example: an oral 
recitation (and shall turn to some other examples in the concluding part of the paper, later). 
The teacher first recites a verse, and the students repeats it after her. In this process, the 
teacher’s recitation causes the student’s ability to repeat it. Still it is not the case that the 
teacher’s ability transfers to the students. Nor is it the case that the student’s ability comes 
from somewhere other than the teacher. If it were the former, the teacher would be left 
deprived of her ability: she would not be able to recite the verse again after that, the problem 
of annihilation would occur. If it is the latter either the student’s ability had to come without a 
cause (ahetubhūtatvāt) or it had come from an entirely unrelated cause. In which case, the 
problem of causelessness would occur. Both these alternatives are unreasonable, however. 
Just as the teacher’s recitation causes the student’s ability to repeat, despite there being no 
transference of the teacher’s ability to the students, in the same way, causes give rise to their 
effects without there being the transference of the causes into the effects. Therefore, the 
problem of persistence (śāśvata doṣaḥ) does not arise (Nāgārjuna PSHV: dBu ma, Tsa 148a). 
Just as the student’s ability neither arises from another cause (other than the teacher’s 
recitation), nor is it without a cause, similarly the effects do not arise from another cause 
(unrelated to the effects) nor without a cause. This way Nāgārjuna resolves both the problems 
of persistence and causelessness. It is clear that the teacher’s recitation causes the student’s 
ability to repeat it. It is however not possible to articulate whether the student’s ability to 
repeat is either identical to or entirely different from the teacher's recitation – the relationship 
between the two is neither one of strict identity nor are they entirely distinct. In the same 
way, although birth arises from karma, it is not reasonable to describe the causal relationship 
between birth and these karmic causes and conditions in terms of either strict identity or strict 
difference (Nāgārjuna PSH:  dBu ma Tsa 148ab). 
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3. Therefore, rebirth occurs since my mind can be associated presently with one body and in 
the future with another  
 
In Premise 3, drawing upon Premise 1 and 2, Dharmakīrti makes the claim that rebirth occurs 
because mind can be associated presently with one body and in the future with another. This 
conclusion operates on the assumption that there is a transference or transmigration of the 
same mind during rebirth without which, according to Hayes, Dharmakīrti could not account 
for rebirth. Dharmakīrti’s claim would be true if Premise 1 and 2 are true, since Premise 3 is 
found on the conclusion of the first two premises. But since we have already shown that 
Premises 1 and 2 are both incoherent, it follows; therefore, that Premise 3 is also incoherent.  
Moreover, the case that Nāgārjuna raises for viewing the relationship between the 
body and mind in non-dichotomous terms, is evident from the way in which he presents the 
phenomenological structure of what is to be a person. A person is invariably defined as a 
phenomenon designated in dependence upon the five aggregates which Nagarjuna argues are 
inextricably interwoven with each other as a unified phenomenological continuum. The five 
aggregates mutually cause each other, arise from each other, and cease with the ceasing of the 
other. Consequently, no single aggregate can be ontologically isolated from the rest; the five 
aggregates invariably dovetail in the phenomenological constitution of a person. While prima 
facie, we may assume that the so-called rūpa-aggregate constitutes a person's physical body, 
in actual fact, the rūpa-aggregate does not have enough content to constitute the body of an 
embodied person: body is not purely physical (like a piece of computer hardware), it must be 
a sentient to become and exist as it is.  
The argument goes in the other direction as well. The so-called mental-aggregates 
that, prima facie, constitute a person's mental states, in actuality, do not have what it takes to 
constitute the mental processes of an embodied person: mental states are not purely non-
phyiscal, they must be embodied. An interdependent existence of the nāma-rūpa aggregate 
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implies that there cannot be any mental episode that is purely non-physical or immaterial just 
in the same way that there cannot be a physical body of a person which is entirely physical. 
The kind of pure consciousness we see in the Sāṁkhya or Cartesian systems is simply an 
impossibility in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of mind. Not surprisingly, the body-mind complex is 
invariably and reciprocally presented as co-arising and mutually dependent nāmarūpa 
complex as a one-fold factor, one of the twelve factors of dependent origination.7  
Nāgārjuna argues that birth arises from the complex combination of causes and 
conditions and from the absence (vaikalyād) of a creative agent (kartr) and the absence 
(aviyogataḥ) of the subjectivity of I-grasping (ahaṁkār). This process of phenomenological 
causation, argues Nāgārjuna, applies to all causally conditioned processes: the arising 
(utpāda), abiding (sthiti), and perishing (vināśā) of all dharmas (ŚK 54cd-55: mDo ‘grel Nge 
20b). In this causal process, there is no dharma anywhere (kvacid) that goes (gantā) from this 
world (asmāllokāt) to the next (paraṁ); nevertheless, from causes and conditions, there 
arises the effect (phalam) of karma (karmaṇaḥ): appearance (abhyeti) (ŚVṬ 56: mDo ‘grel 
Nge 48b). 
While there is nothing whatsoever that goes from this world to the next and 
consequently, no rebirth (janmābhāso) as such, yet there is the appearance of birth, the effect 
of karmic activity in virtue of the non-deficiency of causes and conditions, as when there are 
insufficient causes and conditions (for instance fuel and a flame) fire does not ignite and 
when these causes and conditions are present fire ignites (ŚVṬ 56: mDo ‘grel Nge 49b, cf. ŚK 
63: mDo ‘grel Nge 20b).  
 
4. Therefore, mind and body are distinct 
The conclusion of the mind-body dualism argument is that, mind and body are distinct which 
Hayes goes on to attribute to Dharmakīrti. As I have shown the arguments from Nāgārjuna 
demonstrates that this conclusion does not hold because all the premises Hayes uses to 
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support it are false. Rebirth does not entail annihilation of the aggregates; hence it is not the 
case that death annihilates the body. Rebirth does not entail persistence of the aggregates, 
hence it is not the case that my mind survives death. Therefore, it is not the case that the same 
mind I have now can associate presently with one body and in the future with another. 
Therefore, the conclusion that Buddhist theory of rebirth is premised upon body-mind 
dualism is incoherent.  
 
Implications  
Hayes is right to claim that Dharmakīrti affirms rebirth and seeks nirvāṇa – its cessation. He 
is also right to argue that if there is no rebirth, then the very goal of attaining nirvāṇa, 
understood as the cessation of rebirth, becomes almost utterly meaningless. But Hayes is 
wrong to claim that, in virtue of accepting rebirth, Buddhism must endorse mind-body 
dualism. As I have shown, using Nāgārjuna’s account of rebirth, there is no necessary 
entailment between the premises Hayes employs and the conclusion he drives home. 
Nāgārjuna explicitly argues that the dualistic illusion of subjectivity and objectivity, mind 
and body are nothing more than conceptual fictions sustained by confusion of the basic 
phenomenological structure of who we are as persons. Indeed, there is, strictly speaking, “no 
rebirth” understood in the sense of the same mind being born again, and again because there 
is no single event whatsoever that repeats itself in the causal chain.  
Let us ask this question as a way to bring closure to the analysis we have undertaken 
thus far: what, then, is Nāgārjuna’s own position on rebirth and why does his theory not 
entail mind-body dualism? As we have observed, Nāgārjuna responds to this question by 
arguing that what we usually take to be rebirth – the appearance of persistence over time – is 
in fact only a continuum of momentary, causally dynamic successive events constituting 
mind-matter (nama-rūpa) complex of the five aggregates which we nominally refer to as 
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“person,” or “self.” This continuum, on Nāgārjuna’s view, is both temporally and spatially 
causally effective in two ways. The successive nama-rūpa continuum is synchronically 
causally effective amongst the present aggregates because they simultaneously support and 
cause each other’s existence, like the sheaves of reaves leaning against each other. The 
successive nama-rūpa continuum is diachronically causally effective amongst the successive 
moments of the five aggregates. This is so because the preceding moments produce the 
subsequent moments resemble each other sufficiently, such that they can serve as the basis of 
dependent designation –  allowing us to refer nominally with a single term of reference: 
calling it the “same person.” 
 This causal continuum of the nāma-rūpa complex, often confused with persistent 
personal identity, as exemplified in Dharmakīrti’s mind-body dualist thesis, is nothing more 
than a causal chain itself, where there is no single substance found anywhere independent of 
social conventions which we can identify as the reality of a person. The continuum of the five 
aggregates is designated as a conventionally real person, in that the continuum serves the 
pragmatic purpose of who we are as persons, explaining the principles of karmic 
responsibility and causation.  
Thus, Nāgārjuna’s conception of rebirth takes the middle path. It circumvents causal 
nihilism (ahetu-vādo) which denies the existence of a causal continuum of nāma-rūpa 
complex on the ground that there is no persisting substance from moment to moment, and 
thus no truthmaker for true personal identity. Yet it also circumvents reificationism 
(nityavādo) which assert that there exists a persistent and reductive entity (such as ātman of 
the Naiyāyikas, ālayavijnāña of the Yogācāra, prāpti of the Vaibhāṣika, the continuum of 
mental consciousness of the Sautrāntika and the Svātantrika) that is supposed to be a 
temporally and spatially extended continuum exemplifying what a person is. By contrast, 
Nāgārjuna uses a wide range of analogies such as a flame transferred from lamp to lamp 
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(even though nothing is actually transferred) to explain the continuum across lives, instances 
or births, “stressing the role of causation, without any identity, and the fact that the talk about 
a flame that is transferred is nothing but a façon de parler”, as Garfield puts it (2015, p. 47). 
There is no real flame to be transferred, although it appears that way, there is only a sequence 
of uninterrupted causally related events that serve as the basis of designation: “flame” and 
“transference.” Similarly, rebirth’s basis of designation is a causal continuum of the cluster of 
the five aggregates, but not a continuum of any one individual aggregate in the manner in 
which the Buddhist reductionist sought to reductively identify it. That is, the continuum of 
the cluster of nāma-rūpa complex is causally responsible for constituting the basis for our 
conception as continuing entities through the process of rebirth with a specific pronouns and 
names. But none of the microphenomenological aggregates is the referent of the name 
“rebirth,” just as none is the referent of the names: ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘myself,’ ‘mine’, or even ‘you’, 
‘yourself.” 
Nāgārjuna argues that we can confirm this phenomenon of causal continuum from 
some of the well-known epistemic resources: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) 
and testimony (viśvastāgama) (ŚVṬ 56: dMo ‘grel Nge 48b-49a). The causal continuum of 
nāma-rūpa complex functions like the reflection of a face seen in a well-polished mirror. The 
reflection inside the mirror is indeed not transferred (saṁkrāmitaṁ). The face and the mirror 
are devoid of any intentional thoughts (āvikalpanam) of mutually working together to form 
the reflection of a face: they are bereft (vihīnaṃ) of agent (kartṛ) and action (kriyā). Still 
there is no causal nihilism or interruption in spite of the absence of agent and action. There is 
still the appearance of a face in the mirror because of the non-deficiency of causes and 
conditions. In just the same manner because causes and conditions are not deficient, there is 
the manifestation (āvabhāsanam) of the continuum as birth (utpād), the fruit of karma, based 
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on the progression of deeds previously (pūrva) accumulated and presently being accumulated 
(ŚK 57-58: dMo ‘grel Nge 20b). 
The causal continuum operates like the distant (dūrasthaś) moon (candramaṇḍalaṁ) 
which wanders thousands of leagues above and yet again we can observe the moon’s 
reflection (candrasya pratibimbaṁ) inside of a small water container. There is no 
transference of the moon from its location (tasmātsthānāc), and yet there is the appearance of 
the moon disk in the pool of water because of the non-deficiency of causes and conditions. In 
the same manner, the continuum of nāma-rūpa complex is sustained through impersonal 
activities of karmic forces (Nāgārjuna ŚK 59: dMo ‘grel Nge 20b). There is nothing 
whatsoever in this causal continuum that persists and moves on from this world to the next 
and consequently no rebirth (janmābhāso) as such, yet there is the appearance of birth of the 
continuum, the effect of karmic activity in virtue of the non-deficiency of causes and 
conditions. As when causes and conditions are deficient, fire does not ignite and when causes 
and conditions are complete fire ignites (ŚVṬ 60: dMo ‘grel Nge 49b). Therefore, causal 
continuum of nāma-rūpa complex, Nāgārjuna argues, should always be understood as having 
two kinds of properties: lacks an agent (kartr) and lacks essence (sāraḥ), upon analysis the 
continuum of person is hollow (tuccha) and empty (śūnyā) of intrinsic nature (ŚK 63: dMo 
‘grel Nge 20b). Accordingly, Nāgārjuna concludes that phenomenological continuum is (i) 
non-persistent (na śāśvatataḥ), (ii) non-interrupted (nocchedataḥ), (iii) non-transmigrated (na 
saṁkrāntitaḥ), (iv) one which proceeds from a small cause (parīttahetuto) (abhinirvṛttataḥ) a 
great result (vipulaphala) and (v) in which continuity (ānuprabandhataśceti) invariably 
resembles (sadṛś) that of causes and conditions at play (Vaidya P.L. 1961. ed. ŚS 40: mDo 
sde Ma 190b). 
Through a sustained phenomenological reflection (bhāvanā) focusing on the nature of 
the causal continuum, Nāgārjuna argues, one progressively develops true awareness (viditvā) 
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of the four noble truths (caturāryasatya) realising the causal continuum to be non-substantial 
(asāra), deprived of any substance-reality such as agent (kartrādirahito): hollow (riktas), 
trifling (tuccha), evanescent (anityatā), precarious (duḥkhatā), empty (śūnyatā) and selfless 
(nairātmya) (ŚVṬ 67: dMo ‘grel Nge 52ab). Consequently, all causal continuum of persons 
and of phenomena are correctly recognised (vibhāvane) to be no different from the functional 
operations of illusion, mirage, the city of gandharva, the wheel of a firebrand, an echo, the 
moon’s image in water, the reflection of a face and the like. By means of this reflective 
experience (vibhāvane), one attains the ultimate freedom from the mistaken and dualistic 
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1  I am grateful for Professor Jay L. Garfield’s and the blind assessor’s insightful and incisive 
criticisms on my earlier draft which helped improve the quality of the paper significantly. I 
am equally grateful to Julien T. Wiltshire for carefully editing of the article.  
2 Karin Meyers’s phrase used in her presentation for November 2016 AAR, San Antonio. 
3 Reat (1998, p. 68) and Schoening (1995, p. 324) offer two slightly different ways of 
rendering the verse in English. Note that the Sanskrit words unnāma, translated here as 
"ascending," and avanāma translated here as “descending” are both verbs indicating activities 
or processes of the ascending and descending the beams (daṇḍa / mda’i) of a scale (tulā / 
srang). Unnāma means “the act of bending upwards, raising or rising upward. Avanāma 
means “bending or bowing.” The Tibetan terms mtho and dman used here as the equivalents, 
however, are adjectives. They describe the location of the beams, but they do not adequately 
capture the emphasis given on their activities (Cf. ŚK 63: mDo ‘grel, Nge 50a).  
 
4 Vācaspati Miśra says, when explaining us the Naiyāyika’s account of disintegration, it is an 
absence or non-existence even though disintegration itself, unlike the Sautrāntika, has a 
cause. (Kher 1992, p. 169).  
 
5 In the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya (AKB IV.2b-3b) Vasubandhu presents the Sautrāntika’s 
position of momentary disintegration as both causeless and effectless. (Vasubandhu, AKB 
IV.2b. Skt. ed. Swāmī Dvarīkā Śāstri). Śāntirakṩita makes the same point which is elaborated 
in Kamalaśīla’s Tattvasaṁgraha-Pañjikā TSP. See Kamalaśīla, TSP VIII. 388. Skt. ed. Svāmi 
Dvarīkā Śāstri. 
 
6 Nāgārjuna makes it clear that the dharma in this context includes everything there is. “The 
dharmas are the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhātva), causal sources (āyatana), and 
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interdependently arisen (pratītyasamutpāda) and the like (ādayo)" (Nāgārjuna ŚVṬ 56: mDo 
‘grel Nge 48b).  
 
7 We have two powerful Pali Canonical sources marshaling this line of reasoning. See SN 
II.67.7, Bodhi 2000, p. 607, Ñanananda 2007, p. 38n; DN II.32, Macy 1991.  
 
